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ABSTRACT
There are two main forces behind the large U.S. current account deficits. First, an increase in the
U.S. demand for foreign goods. Second, an increase in the foreign demand for U.S. assets.  Both
forces have contributed to steadily increasing current account deficits since the mid--1990s. This
increase has been accompanied by a real dollar appreciation until late 2001, and a real depreciation
since. The depreciation has accelerated recently, raising the questions of whether and how much
more is to come, and if so, against which currencies, the euro, the yen, or the renminbi.  Our purpose
in this paper is to explore these issues. Our theoretical contribution is to develop a simple portfolio
model of exchange rate and current account determination, and to use it to interpret the past and
explore alternative scenarios for the future. Our practical conclusions are that substantially more


















fgsa@mit.eduThere are two main forces behind the large U.S. current account de¯cits:
First, an increase in the U.S. demand for foreign goods, partly because of
relatively higher U.S. growth, partly because of shifts in demand away from
U.S. goods towards foreign goods.
Second, an increase in the foreign demand for U.S. assets, starting with
high foreign private demand for U.S. equities in the second half of the
1990s, shifting to foreign private and then central bank demands for U.S.
bonds in the 2000s.
Both forces have contributed to steadily increasing current account de¯cits
since the mid{1990s. This increase has been accompanied by a real dollar
appreciation until late 2001, and a real depreciation since. The depreciation
has accelerated recently, raising the questions of whether and how much
more is to come, and if so, against which currencies, the euro, the yen, or
the renminbi.
Our purpose in this paper is to explore these issues. Our contribution is
to develop a simple portfolio model of exchange rate and current account
determination, and to use it to interpret the past and explore the future.
Section 1 presents a two-country model, with the United States and the
rest of the world as the two countries. The model is based on the twin
assumptions of imperfect substitutability both between U.S. and foreign
goods, and between U.S. and foreign assets. This allows us to characterize
the e®ects of both goods and portfolio shifts.
The model is easy to calibrate and provides a convenient way to look at
and organize the facts. We do so in Section 2, and take a ¯rst pass at the
size of the required dollar depreciation.
Section 3 characterizes the dynamics of the model, and focuses on the e®ects
of shifts in relative demand away from U.S. goods, and of shifts in relative
demand towards U.S. assets. The ¯rst imply a steady depreciation of the
2dollar. The second imply an initial appreciation followed by a depreciation,
to a level lower than before the shift. The United States appears to have
entered the depreciation phase. The model again provides a convenient way
of thinking about magnitudes and eventual outcomes.
Our analysis suggests that, in the absence of unexpected events, more de-
preciation is to come. Can things turn out better or worse? Many scenarios
have been discussed, from the potential role of higher U.S. interest rates to
slow/stop the depreciation, to the implications of shifts in portfolio prefer-
ences from U.S. to euro bonds, to changes in the composition of reserves
of Asian central banks, to the °oating of the renminbi. We discuss these
scenarios in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
1 A Portfolio Balance Model of the Current Account
Our model starts from the assumptions that both U.S. and foreign goods,
and U.S. and foreign assets, are imperfect substitutes. Assuming imperfect
substitutability in both goods and asset markets allows us to think about
and trace the e®ects of shifts in preferences for goods and in preferences
for assets.
The model builds on two old (largely and unjustly forgotten) papers,
by Henderson and Rogo® [1982], and, especially, Kouri [1983].1 Both pa-
pers relax the interest parity condition and assume instead imperfect sub-
stitutability of domestic and foreign assets. Henderson and Rogo® focus
mainly on issues of stability. Kouri focuses on the e®ects of changes in
portfolio preferences and the implications of portfolio balance for current
1. The working paper version of the paper by Kouri dates from 1976. One could argue
that there were two fundamental papers written that year on this issue, one by Dornbusch
[1976], who explored the implications of perfect substitutability, the other by Kouri, who
explored the implications of imperfect substitutability. The Dornbusch approach, and its
powerful implications, has dominated research since then. But imperfect substitutability
seems central to the issues we face today.
3account shocks. Our value added is in allowing for a richer description of
gross asset positions. This allows us to analyze valuation e®ects, which have
been at the center of recent empirical research on gross ¯nancial °ows|
in particular by Gourinchas and Rey [2004] and Lane and Milesi{Ferretti
[2004]|, and play an important role in the context of U.S. current account
de¯cits.
1.1 Assumptions
We consider two countries, the United States|the \domestic country"|
and the rest of the world|the \foreign country."
² Let X denote U.S. assets, expressed in terms of U.S. goods. Let W
denote U.S. wealth, also in terms of U.S. goods. Let F denote the
U.S. net debt position vis a vis the rest of the world, again in terms
of U.S. goods. Then, by de¯nition
F = X ¡ W
² Similarly, let X¤ denote foreign assets, in terms of foreign goods
(stars denote foreign variables). Let W¤ denote foreign wealth, in
terms of foreign goods. Let E denote the exchange rate, de¯ned as
the price of U.S. goods in terms of foreign goods. It follows that:
F = W¤=E ¡ X¤=E
² Let the gross rate of return on U.S. assets, in terms of U.S. goods,
be given by (1+r). Let the gross rate of return on foreign assets, in
terms of foreign goods, be given by (1+r¤), so the expected gross rate
of return on foreign assets in terms of U.S. goods is (1 + r¤)E=E
0e.
(Primes denote values of a variable next period, and e stands for
4expected.) The relative expected gross rate of return on holding








² U.S. investors allocate their wealth W between U.S. and foreign
assets. We assume that they allocate a share ® to U.S. assets, and
by implication a share (1 ¡ ®) to foreign assets. Symmetrically, we
assume that foreign investors invest a share ®¤ of their wealth W¤
in foreign assets, and a share (1 ¡ ®¤) in U.S. assets.
We assume that the shares are functions of the relative gross rate
of return, so
® = ®(R); ®R > 0 ®¤ = ®¤(R); ®¤
R < 0
A higher rate of return on U.S. assets increases the U.S. share in
U.S. assets, and decreases the foreign share in foreign assets.
An important parameter in the model is the degree of home bias in
U.S. and foreign portfolios. We assume that there is indeed home







² U.S. and foreign goods are imperfect substitutes, and the excess of
U.S. imports over U.S. exports, the U.S. trade de¯cit, in terms of
U.S. goods is given by
D = D(E;z); DE > 0; Dz > 0
The condition DE > 0 is the Marshall Lerner condition. z stands
for any variable that increases the U.S. trade de¯cit at a given real
5exchange rate. These may be either changes in U.S. or foreign levels
of activity, or shifts in U.S. or foreign relative demands at a given
exchange rate and given activity levels.
1.2 Portfolio Balance
Equilibrium in the market for U.S. assets (and by implication, in the market
for foreign assets) implies
X = ®(R) W + (1 ¡ ®¤(R))
W¤
E
The given supply of U.S. assets must be equal to U.S. demand plus foreign
demand. Given the de¯nition of F introduced earlier, this condition can be
rewritten as




where R is given in turn by equation (1), and depends in particular on E
and E
0e.
This gives us our ¯rst relation, which we shall refer to as the portfolio
balance relation, between net debt, F and the exchange rate, E. The slope
of the relation between net debt and the exchange rate, evaluated at r = r¤
and E




®(1) + ®¤(1) ¡ 1
(1 ¡ ®¤(1))X¤=E2 < 0
So, in the presence of home bias, higher net debt must be associated with
a lower exchange rate. The reason is that, as wealth is transfered from the
United States to the rest of the world, home bias leads to a decrease in the
6demand for U.S. assets, which in turn requires a decrease in the exchange
rate.
1.3 Current Account Balance
Turn now to the equation giving the dynamics of the U.S. net debt position.
Given our assumptions, U.S. net debt next period, F0, is given by
F0 = (1 ¡ ®¤(R))
W¤
E
(1 + r) ¡ (1 ¡ ®(R)) W (1 + r¤)
E
E0 + D(E0)
Net debt next period is equal to next period's value of U.S. assets held by
foreign investors, minus next period's value of foreign assets held by U.S.
investors, plus next period's trade de¯cit:
² The value of U.S. assets held by foreign investors next period is equal
to their wealth in terms of U.S. goods this period W¤=E, times the
share they invest in U.S. assets, (1 ¡ ®¤), times the gross rate of
return on U.S. assets in terms of U.S. goods.
² The value of foreign assets held by U.S. investors next period is
equal to U.S. wealth this period, W, times the share invested in
foreign assets (1 ¡ ®), times the (realized) gross rate of return on
foreign assets in terms of U.S. goods, (1 + r¤)E=E0.
The previous equation can be rewritten as





0 )(X ¡ F) + D(E
0
) (3)
We shall call this the current account balance relation.
The ¯rst and last terms on the right are standard: Next period net debt is
equal to this period net debt times the gross rate of return, plus the trade
de¯cit next period.
7The term in the middle re°ects valuation e®ects, recently stressed by Gour-
inchas and Rey [2004], and Lane and Milesi{Ferretti [2004]. Consider for
example an unexpected decrease in the price of U.S. goods, an unexpected
decrease in E0 relative to E|a dollar depreciation for short.2 This depre-
ciation increases the dollar value of U.S. holdings of foreign assets. Put
another way, a depreciation improves the net debt position in two ways,
the conventional one through the improvement in the trade balance, the
second through asset revaluation. Note that:
² The strength of the valuation e®ects depends on gross rather than
net positions, and so on the share of the U.S. portfolio in foreign
assets, (1 ¡ ®), and on the size of U.S. wealth, X ¡ F. It is present
even if F = 0.
² The strength of valuation e®ects depends on our assumption that
U.S. gross liabilities are denoted in dollars, and so their value in dol-
lars are una®ected by a dollar depreciation. Valuation e®ects would
obviously be very di®erent when, as is typically the case for emerging
countries, gross positions were smaller, and liabilities were denomi-
nated in foreign currency.
² We have focused on the e®ects of an unexpected depreciation. Note
however that a period of anticipated depreciation, if foreigners are
willing to hold U.S. assets at a lower rate of return, will achieve the
same result, but do so over time. We shall return to this issue when
characterizing dynamics later.
In steady state, equation (3) reduces to the simpler
0 = rF + (1 ¡ ®(R))(r ¡ r¤)(X ¡ F) + D(E;z) (4)
The current account de¯cit, which is equal to interest payments on the net
2. Throughout the paper, we use \dollar depreciation or appreciation" to refer to a real
depreciation or real appreciation.
8debt position, plus the interest rate di®erential on the gross position, plus
the trade de¯cit, has to be equal to zero.
This relation implies a negative relation between net debt and the exchange
rate in steady state: Higher net debt implies larger interest payments, and
therefore a larger trade surplus to achieve current account balance. This
larger trade surplus must be achieved through a lower exchange rate.
1.4 External and Internal Balance
An additional condition must hold in equilibrium, namely that the U.S.
trade de¯cit be equal to minus U.S. saving (with a similar condition holding
for the foreign country.)3 Write this condition as:
D(E;z) = ¡S(r;:) (5)
where saving is taken to be a function of the interest rate, r, and other
unspeci¯ed factors, from activity levels, to wealth, to budget de¯cits.
Introducing a fully speci¯ed saving function, and using this additional con-
dition would allow us to solve for the path of the exchange rate, the current
account, and the interest rates in response to shocks. We take instead a
short cut, and take r and r¤ as given in equations (1), (2) and (3).4 By tak-
ing interest rates as ¯xed, we are implicitly making one of two assumptions:
The ¯rst is that saving adjusts through changes in the level of activity,
along standard Keynesian lines. The second is that the government takes
3. There is no investment in our model.
4. Henderson and Rogo® take the other route, specifying a saving function, and using
(5). To keep their analysis tractable however, they simplify the rest of the model by
assuming perfect substitutability of domestic and foreign goods, so the real exchange rate
is constant. Given our interest in understanding movements in the U.S. real exchange
rate, we prefer not to endogenize interest rates, and allow for imperfect substitutability
between U.S. and foreign goods.
9measures to adjust saving as the trade de¯cit changes|for example by re-
ducing the ¯scal de¯cit as the trade de¯cit is reduced|so as to maintain
output at its natural level. Given the span of time over which the dynamics
take place, we prefer the second of the two interpretations.
This may be the place to make a point sometimes overlooked in today's
discussions of the current account de¯cit.5 To reduce the trade de¯cit while
maintaining stable output, the depreciation must come with other measures
which increase domestic saving, such as a decrease in budget de¯cits. In
other words, equation (5) has to hold. These other measures however have
to come in addition to the depreciation. The statement that a reduction in
budget de¯cits reduces or eliminates the need for depreciation is obviously
incorrect.
2 Turning to Numbers
Before moving to dynamics, it is useful to get a sense of magnitudes for the
various parameters of the model, and look at some of their implications.
² In 2003, U.S. ¯nancial wealth, W, was equal to $35 trillion. Non{
U.S. world ¯nancial wealth is harder to assess. Based on a ratio of
¯nancial assets to GDP of about 2 for Japan and Europe, and a
GDP for non{U.S. world of approximately $18 trillion in 2003, a
reasonable estimate for W¤=E is $36 trillion|so about the same as
for the United States.
² In 2003, F, net U.S. debt, at market value, was equal to $2.7 trillion,
up from approximate balance in the early 1990s. By implication,
U.S. assets, X, were equal to W + F = $35 + $2:7 = $37:7 trillion.
5. A similar point is emphasized by Obstfeld and Rogo® [2004].
10Foreign assets, X¤=E, were equal to W¤=E¡F = $36¡$2:7 = $33:3
trillion.
Put another way, the ratio of U.S. net debt to U.S. assets, F=X,
was 2.7/(35+2.7) = 7.1%; the ratio of U.S. net debt to U.S. GDP
was equal to 2.7/11 = 25%.
² In 2003, U.S. holdings of foreign assets, at market value, were equal
to $8.0 trillion. Together with the value for W, this implies that the
share of U.S. wealth in U.S. assets, ®, was equal to 1 ¡ (8:0=35) =
0:77. Foreign holdings of U.S. assets, at market value, were equal
to $10.7 trillion. Together with the value of W¤=E, this implies
that the share of foreign wealth in foreign assets, ®¤, was equal to
1 ¡ (10:7=36) = 0:70.
To get a sense of the implications of these values for ® and ®¤, note,
from equation (2) that a transfer of one dollar from U.S. wealth to
foreign wealth implies a decrease in the demand for U.S. assets of
(® + ®¤ ¡ 1) dollars, or 47 cents.6
As current account de¯cits are leading to a steady increase in F,
this estimate implies, other things equal, a steady decrease in the
demand for U.S. assets. This will play a role in the dynamic adjust-
ment we describe in the next section.
Table 1 summarizes the values derived above.
6. Note that this conclusion is dependent on the assumption we make in our model
that marginal and average shares are equal. This may not be the case.
11Table 1. Wealth, Assets, and Shares
W W¤=E X X¤=E F ® ®¤
$35 $36 $37.5 $34.5 $2.7 0.77 0.70
W;W¤=E;X;X¤=E;F are in trillions of dollars
The other important coe±cient is the e®ect of the exchange rate on the
trade balance. De¯ne µ as the derivative of the ratio of the trade balance
to GDP with respect to a proportional change in the real exchange rate,
µ ´ (dD=Exports)=(dE=E). Then, starting from initial trade balance
µ = (´ im ¡ ´ exp ¡ 1)
where ´im and ´exp's are the import and export elasticities with respect
to the real exchange rate.
Estimates based on estimated U.S. import and export equations range quite
widely (see the survey by Chinn [2002]). In some cases, the estimates imply
that the Marshall{Lerner condition (the condition that µ be positive, so
a depreciation improves the trade balance) is barely satis¯ed. Estimates
used in macroeconometric models imply a value of µ between 0.5 and 0.9.7
Put another way, together with the assumption that the ratio of exports
to GDP is equal to 10%, they imply that a reduction of the ratio of the
trade de¯cit to GDP of 1% requires a depreciation somewhere between 11
and 20%.
One may believe however that measurement error, complex lag structures,
and mispeci¯cation all bias these estimates downwards. An alternative ap-
7. The estimates by Hooper et al [2001] ( ´ exp = ¡1:5 and ´ imp = 0:3), are repre-
sentative.
12proach is to derive the elasticities from plausible speci¯cations of utility,
and of pass-through behavior of ¯rms. Using such an approach, and a
model with non tradable goods, tradable domestic goods, and foreign trad-
able goods, Obstfeld and Rogo® [2004] ¯nd that a decrease in the trade
de¯cit to GDP of 1% requires a decrease in the real exchange rate some-
where between 7% and 10%|thus, a smaller depreciation than implied by
macroeconometric models.
Which value to use is obviously crucial to assess the scope of the required
exchange rate adjustment. We choose an estimate of 0:7 for µ|towards
the high range of empirical estimates, but substantially lower than the
Obstfeld Rogo® elasticities. This estimate, together with an export ratio
of 10%, implies that a reduction of the ratio of the trade de¯cit to GDP of
1% requires a depreciation of 15%.
The Required Dollar Depreciation: A First Pass
With these parameters, we can do a simple exercise|computing the de-
preciation that would be needed to achieve current account balance, given
today's foreign indebtdness.
Consider the e®ects of a depreciation of the dollar of 15%. Given our choice
of µ, and absent valuation e®ects, the e®ect of such depreciation is to reduce
the ratio of the trade de¯cit to GDP by 1%.
This ignores valuation e®ects however. If the depreciation is unexpected,
its e®ect is to increase the value of U.S. holdings of foreign assets by 15%.
This implies a decrease in the ratio of net debt to GDP of 15% times
(1¡®)(X ¡F)=Y or about 10%. If we assume a rate of return on assets of
4%, this decrease in net debt implies a reduction in interest payments, in
terms of U.S. goods, of 0.4% of GDP. Adding the trade balance and valu-
ation e®ects implies that an unexpected depreciation improves the current
13account balance by 1.4%.8
Now consider a rough characterization of the U.S. position: A trade de¯cit
of 5% of GDP, a ratio of net debt to GDP of 25%, an interest rate of 4%,
and so a current account de¯cit of 6%. We can ask what depreciation would
be required to eliminate the current account de¯cit today:
Ignoring valuation e®ects|and ignoring also the non{linearities present
in the model; these non{linearities lead to even larger estimates of the
required depreciation|achieving current account balance would require a
trade surplus of 1%, and so a dollar depreciation of 15 times 6% = 90%.
Taking into account valuation e®ects, and assuming that the depreciation
is unexpected, the required depreciation is \only" 65%: The trade de¯cit is
still positive, equal to 0.7% of GDP. But the depreciation shifts the United
States from being a net debtor to being a net creditor, and so, net interest
payments are enough to o®set the trade de¯cit.
90% or even 65% are very large numbers. They must be quali¯ed in at least
two ways:
² Despite positive U.S. net debt in 2003, payments from the rest of
the world actually exceeded payments from the United States to the
rest of the world. (Transfers, not interest payments, were the reason
why the current account de¯cit was higher than the trade de¯cit.)
This re°ects the fact that r was less than r¤, leading to smaller
payments on foreign holdings of U.S. assets than on U.S. holdings
of foreign assets|the second term in equation (5). Our parameters
imply that for each 1% decrease in r below r¤, the ratio of net
interest payments to GDP decreases by 1% times (1 ¡ ®)W=Y %,
or 0.75%. If we assume that the interest di®erential observed in the
8. A similar computation is given by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti [2004] for a number of
countries, although not for the United States.
14recent past was anticipated, and that U.S. assets will continue to
pay 1% less than foreign assets in the future, this requires 8% less
depreciation of the dollar to achieve current account balance.
² Growth is equal to zero in our model, so the current account has to
be balanced in steady state. As Ventura [2003] has argued however,
in the presence of growth, allowing the U.S. to maintain a constant
ratio of net debt to GDP allows for a current account de¯cit in
steady state, and so requires a smaller adjustment than implied by
the computation above. It is straightforward to extend our com-
putation to allow for growth. A growth rate of 4% and a constant
ratio of net debt to GDP of 25% allows for a current account de¯cit
of 1.0% of GDP. This further reduces the required depreciation by
another 10%.
Putting the di®erent estimates together gives depreciation rates ranging
from 90% to about 40%, starting roughly from today's level.9
These are very large numbers. There is however no likelihood|and indeed
no need|for such a current account adjustment to take place overnight.
It can and will clearly take place over time; however as time passes, F will
increase, and so will the size of the required adjustment. This takes us to
dynamics.
3 Steady state, Dynamics, and Shifts
To present and discuss the dynamic response to shocks in the model, the
easiest way is to take the continuous time limit of our two equations and
use a phase diagram. Also for simplication, in this section, we assume
9. Yet another adjustment should re°ect that the current trade de¯cit numbers show
the adverse J{curve e®ects of the dollar depreciation over the last two years. We have
not estimated it yet.
15r = r¤; we shall return to the role of interest rate di®erentials in discussing
scenarios later on. (For the readers uninterested in technical details, the
main conclusions are stated at the end of the subsection on goods and
assets preference shifts.)
3.1 Equilibrium and Dynamics
In continuous time, the portfolio and current account balance equations
become:
X = ®(1 +
_ Ee
E













(X ¡ F) + D(E)
Note the presence of both expected and actual depreciation in the current
account balance relation. Expected appreciation determines the share of
the U.S. portfolio put in foreign assets; actual appreciation determines the
change in the value of that portfolio, and in turn the change in the U.S.
net debt position.
The equilibrium and local dynamics are characterized in Figure 1.10
The locus ( _ E = _ Ee = 0) is obtained from the portfolio balance equation,
and is downward sloping: In the presence of home bias, an increase in
net debt shifts wealth abroad, decreasing the demand for U.S. assets, and
requiring a depreciation.
The locus ( _ F = 0) is obtained by assuming ( _ Ee = _ E) in the current account
balance ration, and replacing ( _ Ee) by its implied value in the portfolio
10. We have not yet fully characterized global dynamics. The non linearities imbedded
in the equations imply that the economy is likely to have two equilibria, one of them
saddle point stable. This is the equilibrium we focus on.
16balance equation. This locus is also downward sloping: A depreciation leads
to a smaller trade de¯cit, and thus allows for a larger net debt position
consistent with current account balance.
The condition for the equilibrium to be saddle point stable is that the locus
( _ F = 0) be °atter than the ( _ E = 0) locus. For this to hold, the following




® + ®¤ ¡ 1
(1 ¡ ®¤)X¤=E2
This condition has a simple and intuitive interpretation. Consider the ef-
fects of an increase in U.S. net debt F:
² On the one hand, the increase in F increases interest payments on
the debt. This increase in interest payments leads to a deterioration
of the current account.
² On the other hand, the increase in F leads to a decrease in the
demand for U.S. assets, and so to a depreciation. This depreciation
leads in turn to an improvement in the trade balance, and so to an
improvement in the current account.
The condition above is the condition that the net result of these two e®ects
on the current account be positive, so an increase in net debt reduces
the current account de¯cit. It is more likely to be satis¯ed, the smaller
the interest rate, and the larger the response of the trade balance to the
exchange rate.
We assume this condition to be satis¯ed in what follows. In that case, the
equilibrium is as in Figure 1. The relation ( _ E = 0) is downward sloping.
The relation ( _ F = 0) is also downward sloping and °atter. The dynamics
are as indicated in the ¯gure. The saddle point path is downward sloping.
Starting from net debt below the steady state level, net debt increases, and
the exchange rate decreases.
17Figure 1.  Adjustment of the exchange rate and the net debt position. 
E
dF/dt=0
dE/dt = 0 
FThe steady state values of F and E are given by:




0 = rF + D(E)
Supply and demand for U.S. assets must be equal, at a given relative re-
turn equal to one. And the current account de¯cit, i.e the sum of interest
payments on net debt and the trade de¯cit, must be equal to zero.
Note that the steady state is independent of the elasticities of ® and ®¤
with respect to the relative return. But these elasticities have an important
e®ect on the position of the saddle point path, and in turn on the dynamics
of adjustment (the implications will be clear when we look at shifts below).
The two elasticities do not a®ect the slope of the _ E = 0 locus. They do
however a®ect the slope of the _ F = 0, and by implication the slope of the
saddle point path:
² The smaller the two elasticities, the closer the locus ( _ F = 0) is to
the ( _ E = 0), and the closer the saddle point path is to the ( _ E = 0).
In the limit, if the degree of substitutability between U.S. and foreign
assets is equal to zero and the shares are invariant, the two loci (and
the saddle point path) coincide, and the economy remains on and
adjusts along the ( _ E = 0), the portfolio balance relation.
² The larger the two elasticities, the closer the ( _ F = 0) locus is to the
locus given by 0 = rF +D(E), and the closer the saddle point path
is to that locus as well. The larger the elasticities, the slower the
adjustment of F and E over time. The slow adjustment of F comes
from the fact that we are close to current account balance. The slow
adjustment of E comes from the fact that, the larger the elasticities,
18the smaller is _ E for a given distance from the _ E = 0 locus.
The limiting case of perfect substitutability is degenerate in our
model. The speed of adjustment goes to zero. The economy is always
on the locus 0 = rF +D(E). For any level of net debt, the exchange
rate adjusts so net debt remains constant, and, in the absence of
shocks, the economy stays at that point. There is no steady state,
and where the economy is depends on history.
3.2 Goods and Assets Preference Shifts
Figures 2a and 2b show the dynamic e®ects of the two types of shifts we
believe have dominated the evolution of the current account and the dollar
over the last ten years.
Figure 2a shows the e®ect of an (unexpected) increase in z, so for a given
exchange rate, the trade de¯cit is now larger. One can think of z as coming
either from increases in U.S. activity relative to foreign activity, or from a
shift in exports or imports at a given level of activity and a given exchange
rate; we defer a discussion of the sources of the actual shift in z over the
past decade in the United States to the next section.
The implication is a downward shift of the ( _ F = 0) locus, and so a down-
ward shift of the saddle point path. At the time of the shift, valuation
e®ects imply that any unexpected depreciation leads to an unexpected de-
crease in the net debt position. Denoting by ¢E the unexpected change in
the exchange rate at the time of the shift, it follows from equation (3) that
the relation between the two at the time of the shift is given by:




The economy jumps initially from A to B, and then converges over time
along the saddle point path, from B to C. The shift in the trade de¯cit leads
19Figure 2a.  Adjustment of the exchange rate and the net debt position 
to a shift in the trade deficit. 






FFigure 2b.  Adjustment of the exchange rate and the net debt position 
to a portfolio shift towards U.S. assets
dF/dt=0






Fto an initial, unexpected, depreciation, followed by further depreciation
over time and net debt accumulation until the new steady state is reached.
The degree of imperfect substitutability plays an important role in the
nature of the adjustment, and in the respective roles of the initial unex-
pected depreciation, and the anticipated depreciation thereafter. The less
substitutable U.S. and foreign assets are, the closer the saddle point path
to the _ E = 0 locus, the smaller the initial depreciation, and the larger the
anticipated rate of depreciation thereafter. The more substitutable U.S.
and foreign assets are, the closer the saddle point path is to the locus
0 = rF ¡ D(E), the larger the initial depreciation, the smaller the antici-
pated rate of depreciation thereafter.11
Figure 2b shows the e®ect of an (unexpected) increase in the demand for
U.S. assets, coming for example from an increase in ®(1) and/or a decrease
in foreign home bias, ®¤(1). The portfolio balance locus _ E = 0 shifts up,
and the new equilibrium is associated with a higher saddle point path. The
initial adjustment of E and F must again satisfy condition (6). So, the
economy jumps from A to B, and then converges over time from B to C.
The dollar initially appreciates, triggering an increase in the trade de¯cit
and a deterioration of the net debt position. Over time, net debt increases,
and the dollar depreciates. In the new equilibrium, the exchange rate is
necessarily lower than before the shift: This re°ects the need for a larger
trade surplus to o®set the interest payments on the now larger U.S. net
debt. In the long run, the favorable portfolio shift leads to a depreciation.
Again, the degree of substitutability between assets plays an important
role in the adjustment. The less substitutable U.S. and foreign assets, the
higher the initial appreciation, and the larger the anticipated rate of de-
preciation thereafter. The more substitutable the assets, the smaller the
11. The time to adjustment is an increasing function of the degree of substitutability. In
the limiting case of perfect substitutability, the depreciation is such as to achieve current
account balance right away. Net debt remains constant, and so does the exchange rate.
20initial appreciation, and the smaller the anticipated rate of depreciation
thereafter.
The characterization of the equilibrium and the dynamic e®ects of prefer-
ence shifts yield three main conclusions:
² Shifts in preferences towards foreign goods lead to an initial depre-
ciation, followed by further anticipated depreciation. Shifts in pref-
erences towards U.S. assets lead to an initial appreciation, followed
by an anticipated depreciation.
² The empirical evidence suggests that both types of shifts have been
at work in the recent past in the United States. The ¯rst shift, by it-
self, would have implied a steady depreciation in line with increased
trade de¯cits, while we observed an initial appreciation. The second
shift can explain why the initial appreciation has been followed by a
depreciation. But it attributes the increase in the trade de¯cit fully
to the initial appreciation, whereas the evidence is of a large adverse
shift in the trade balance even after controlling for the e®ects of the
exchange rate.12
² Both shifts lead eventually to a steady depreciation, a lower ex-
change rate than before the shift. This follows from the simple con-
dition that higher net debt, no matter its origin, requires larger
interest payments in steady state, and thus a larger trade surplus.
The lower the degree of substitutability between U.S. and foreign
assets, the higher the expected rate of depreciation along the path
of adjustment. We appear indeed to have entered this depreciation
phase in the United States.
12. This does not do justice to an alternative, and more conventional monetary policy
explanation, high U.S. interest rates relative to foreign interest rates at the end of the
1990s, leading to an appreciation, followed since by a depreciation. Relative interest rate
di®erentials seem too small to explain the movement in exchange rates, but this needs
to be explored more precisely.
213.3 Back to numbers
The process of adjustment to a shift, and the size of the initial exchange
rate adjustment both depend on the degree of substitutability between
U.S. and foreign assets, something we know little about in practice.13 The
steady state however does not. This again allows us to do a number of
simple exercises.
Consider for example, a shift in preferences towards U.S. assets. From Fig-
ure 2b, it follows that the initial appreciation is bounded from above by








So, given the values of the variables given earlier, an increase in ®(1) of
1 percentage point may lead to an appreciation of up to 7%. The more
inelastic the shares, the stronger the appreciation.
What about the long run depreciation and increase in net debt? Table 2
shows the steady state e®ects of symmetric increases in ®(1) and decreases
in ®¤(1), each by 1 percentage point. The parameters are chosen to roughly
¯t the data, and imply an initial steady state value of F0 = 0 and E0 = 1.
They are listed under the table.
13. The empirical ¯ndings by Gourinchas and Rey [2004] that the U.S. net debt position
helps predict the rate of change of the dollar exchange rate is consistent with the impli-
cations of our model under imperfect substitutability. Their empirical estimate may give
a way of indirectly estimating the degree of substitutability between U.S. and foreign
assets. We have not yet explored this connection.
22Table 2. E®ects of a shift in portfolio preferences
r µ F=X E=E0
0.01 0.7 0.12 0.80
0.00 0.7 0.08 0.85
0.02 0.7 0.24 0.67
0.01 0.5 0.38 0.56
0.01 0.9 0.08 0.86
( d® = ¡d®¤ = 1 percentage point. Other parameters: ®(1)0 = ®¤(1)0 =
0:75;X = X¤ = 1;r¤ = r)
The ¯rst line of the table gives a benchmark. We think of r as equal to the
interest rate minus the growth rate, and choose it equal to 1%. We assume
µ (the derivative of the ratio of the trade balance to GDP with respect
to a proportional change in the exchange rate) to be equal to 0.7. In this
benchmark, the steady state e®ect of a shift in shares by one percentage
point is an increase in the ratio of net debt to assets of 12% (equivalently,
36% of GDP), and a 20% depreciation.
The second and third lines show the e®ects of lower or higher interest
rates. In the second line, r = 0, so that higher net debt does not require
a larger trade surplus. The accumulation of assets is smaller, and so is the
depreciation. The third line, the higher interest rate leads to a much larger
net debt position and a larger required depreciation. Values of r above 2.5%
lead to instability: The e®ect of higher net debt dominates the e®ects of
the depreciation on the trade de¯cit.
The last two lines show the e®ects of di®erent responses of the trade balance
to the exchange rate|di®erent values of µ. In the ¯rst, the response of the
trade balance as a ratio to GDP is 0.5, instead of 0.7 in the benchmark.
The steady state e®ect is much larger net debt accumulation, and a much
23larger depreciation. In the second, the response is assumed to be 0.9, and
the e®ects on net debt and the exchange rate are much smaller.
If the degree of substitutability of U.S. and foreign assets is high, it may
take a long time to get to the steady state, so we do not want to overempha-
size the steady state results. But we see the basic lesson as straightforward.
The forces leading to a return to current account balance are weak, and it
may take a long time, a large increase in net debt, and by implication a
large depreciation of the dollar.
4 Scenarios
If we think of the saddle point paths in Figure 2a or Figure 2b as giving
the path of the dollar and net debt in the absence of further, unexpected,
shifts, our analysis suggests slow but steady dollar depreciation for a long
time to come. The continuing increase in net debt implies that the eventual
depreciation will have to be substantially larger than the depreciation which
would lead to a sustainable current account today|the computation we
went through in Section 2.
Can these forecasts be wrong? Obviously yes. There can be both good
and bad news, and we now discuss a few such scenarios (All these scenar-
ios are obviously already re°ected in the current exchange rate, but with
probability less than one).
4.1 Unambiguously Good News. A Favorable Shift in z?
The only news that would be unambiguously good for both the dollar and
the current account de¯cit would be a decrease in z, i.e. decreases in the
trade de¯cit at a given exchange rate.
24To get a sense of where these shifts may come from, it is useful to identify
the sources of the deterioration of the U.S. trade de¯cit, controlling for the
exchange rate, over the last decade.
Some have argued that the shift has come mostly from faster growth in
the United States relative to its trade partners, leading imports to the
United States to increase faster than exports to the rest of the world. This
appears however to have played a limited role. Europe and Japan indeed
have had lower growth than the United States (45% cumulative growth
for the United States from 1990 to 2004, 29% for the Euro Area, 25% for
Japan), but they account for only 35% of U.S. exports, and other U.S.
trade partners have grown as fast or faster as the United States. A study
by the IMF [2004] ¯nds nearly identical growth rates for the United States
and its trade{weighted partners since the early 1990s.14
Some have argued that the deterioration in the trade balance does not
re°ect a shift in z, but is instead the result of sustained U.S. growth together
with a high U.S. import elasticity (1.5 or higher). Under this view, high
U.S. growth has led to a more than proportional increase in imports, and
an increasing trade de¯cit. The debate about the correct value of the U.S.
import elasticity is an old one, dating back to the estimates by Houthakker
and Magee [1969]; we tend to side with the recent conclusion by Marquez
[2000] that the elasticity is close to one. For our purposes however, this
discussion is not relevant. Whether the evolution of the trade de¯cit is the
result of a shift in z or the result of a high import elasticity, there are
no obvious reasons to expect either the shift to reverse, or growth in the
United States to drastically decrease in the future.15
14. In the forecasting macroeconomic model used by \Global Insight", shifts and un-
explained time trends account for $125 billion of the $327 billion increase in the non
petroleum trade de¯cit from 1998:1 to 2004:3, so about 40% of the increase; activity and
exchange rate e®ects account for the rest. (We are indebted to Nigel Gault for running
a simulation of the model and generating these numbers.)
15. The fact that a substantial proportion of the increase in the trade de¯cit is due to
25Even if the slowdown in Europe and Japan has played a small role, one can
still ask how much an increase in growth in Europe would reduce the U.S.
trade de¯cit. A simple computation is as follows. Suppose that Europe and
Japan made up the 15% growth gap they have accumulated since 1990 vis a
vis the United States|an unlikely scenario in the near future|and so U.S.
exports to Western Europe and Japan increased by 15%. Given that U.S.
exports to these countries account for about 350 billion, the improvement
would be 0.5% of U.S. GDP|not negligible, but not major either.
All other scenarios imply either good news for the dollar (but bad news for
the current account, and net debt), or bad news for the dollar (but good
news for the current account and net debt accumulation). Let's look at a
few.
4.2 Good News for the Dollar? Further Shifts in Portfolio
Preferences
At a given exchange rate, today's U.S. current account de¯cit implies a
steady increase in the share of U.S. assets in U.S. and foreign portfolios.
Assuming for example a growth rate for U.S. and foreign assets of 4% a
year, and assuming that ® remains constant, a current account de¯cit of
about $600 billion requires an increase in (1¡®¤) of about two percentage
points a year.
Some have suggested that the United States can continue to ¯nance current
account de¯cits at the current level for a long time to come, at the same
exchange rate and same expected rate of return. In other words, they argue
that foreign investors will be willing to further increase (1¡®¤(1)), and/or
shifts in the export and import relations sheds doubt on the proposition that the trade
de¯cit is mostly due to the budget de¯cit. The e®ect of the budget de¯cit on the trade
balance should show up through the e®ects of either high activity or an appreciated
exchange rate in the export and import relations, not through shifts in those relations.
26that domestic investors will be willing to further increase ®(1) (for example,
Caballero et al [2004]). Nothing is impossible, although the opposite|a
shift away from U.S. assets, at least by central banks|at this point seems
to us more likely.
In any case, as we have seen, the relief would only be temporary. The shift
in preferences would limit the depreciation or even lead to an appreciation
of the dollar for some time. The appreciation, and the accompanying loss
of competitiveness, would speed the accumulation of foreign debt however.
The long run value of the dollar would be even lower.
4.3 Good News for the Dollar? Higher U.S. Interest Rates
Some have suggested that increases in U.S. interest rates may be sharper
than markets currently anticipate, and so may stop or reverse the depreci-
ation of the dollar.
To discuss this possibility, we can use our model, allowing r to be di®erent
from r¤. In this case, and taking the continuous time limit, the portfolio
and current account balance equations are given by




_ F = rF + (1 ¡ ®(R))(r ¡ r¤ ¡
_ E
E
)(X ¡ F) + D(E)
where R ¡ 1 ´ (r ¡ r¤ + _ Ee=E).
Figure 3 shows the e®ects of an increase in r keeping r¤ constant, starting
from steady state and a positive net debt position.16 An increase in r has
two e®ects:
16. Under perfect substitutability, the U.S. and foreign interest rates must be equal for
the economy to be in steady state. Under imperfect substitutability, the two interest
rates can di®er even in steady state.
27Figure 3.  Adjustment of the exchange rate and the net debt position 
to an increase in the U.S. interest rate
dF/dt=0





F² It shifts the _ E = 0 locus up: The increased return on U.S. assets
increases the demand for U.S. assets and leads to an appreciation.
² It shifts the _ F = 0 locus down, for two reasons.
The ¯rst is that the United States now has to pay higher interest
payments on its net debt position. This e®ect is equal to zero if net
debt is initially equal to zero.
The second is that the United States has to pay higher interest
payments on its gross liabilities, (1¡®)(X¡F). This e®ect is present
even if net debt is equal to zero.
The result of the shifts is shown in Figure 3, which also shows the sad-
dle point path and the adjustment path. As drawn, the exchange rate
appreciates, but, in general, the initial e®ect on the exchange rate is am-
biguous: If gross liabilities are large for example, then the e®ect of higher
interest payments on the current account balance may well dominate the
more conventional e®ects of increased attractiveness and lead to an initial
depreciation rather than an appreciation.
In any case, the steady state e®ect is higher net debt accumulation, and
thus a larger depreciation than if r had not increased. Good initial news
on the dollar is again bad news for the dollar and for net debt in the long
run.
If the purpose is to limit the eventual dollar depreciation, then the right
monetary policy is actually to decrease interest rates, so as to have a larger
depreciation in the short run, and a smaller depreciation in the long run. In
order to achieve the corresponding increase in saving, such a policy must
be accompanied by a reduction of the budget de¯cit, so as to maintain
output at its natural level.
284.4 Bad News for the Dollar? Asian Central Banks
Much of the recent accumulation of U.S. assets has taken the form of accu-
mulation of reserves by the Japanese and the Chinese central banks. Many
worry that this will not last, that the pegging of the renminbi will come to
an end, or that both central banks will want to change the composition of
their reserves away from U.S. assets, leading to further depreciation of the
dollar.
Our model provides a simple way of discussing the issue. Consider pegging
¯rst. Pegging means that the foreign central bank buys dollar assets so as
keep E = ¹ E.17 Let B denote the reserves (i.e the U.S. assets) held by the
foreign central bank, so




The dynamics under pegging are characterized in Figure 4. Suppose that,
in the absence of pegging, the steady state is given by point A, and that
the foreign central bank pegs the exchange rate at level ¹ E. As ¹ E is such
that the U.S. current account is in de¯cit, F increases over time. Wealth
gets steadily transfered to the foreign country, so the private demand for
U.S. assets steadily decreases. To keep E unchanged, B must increase fur-
ther over time. Pegging by the foreign central bank is thus equivalent to
a continuous outward shift in the portfolio balance schedule: What the
foreign central bank is e®ectively doing is keeping world demand for U.S.
assets unchanged by o®setting the fall in private demand. Pegging leads to
a steady increase in U.S. net debt, and a steady increase in reserves o®set-
ting the steady decrease in private demands for U.S. assets. This path is
represented by the path DC in Figure 4.
17. Our two-country model has only one foreign central bank, and so we cannot discuss
what happens if one foreign bank pegs and the others do not. The issue is however
relevant in thinking about the joint evolutions of the dollar{euro and the dollar{yen
exchange rates. More on this below.
29Figure 4.  Adjustment of the exchange rate and the net debt position 
to the end of pegging. 
dF/dt=0








EWhat happens when the foreign central bank (unexpectedly) stops peg-
ging? The adjustment is represented in Figure 4. With the economy at
point C just before the abandon of the peg, the economy jumps to G (re-
call that valuation e®ects lead to a decrease in net debt when there is an
unexpected depreciation), and the economy then adjusts along the saddle
point path DA0. The longer the peg lasts, the larger the initial and the
eventual depreciation.
In other words, an early end to the Chinese peg will obviously lead to a
depreciation of the dollar (an appreciation of the renminbi). But the sooner
it takes place, the smaller the required depreciation, both initially, and in
the long run. Put another way, the longer the Chinese wait to abandon the
peg, the larger the eventual appreciation of the renminbi.
The conclusions are very similar with respect to changes in the compo-
sition of reserves. We can think of such changes as changes in portfolio
preferences, this time not by private investors but by central banks, so we
can apply our earlier analysis directly. A shift away from U.S. assets will
lead to an initial depreciation, leading to a lower current account de¯cit,
a smaller increase in net debt, and thus to a smaller depreciation in the
long run. Put another way, the longer the Chinese wait to diversify their
reserves, the larger the eventual appreciation of the renminbi.
How large might these shifts be? Chinese reserves are currently equal to
500 billion, Japanese reserves to 850 billion. Assuming that these reserves
are now held in dollars and the PBC and the BOJ were to reduce their
dollar holdings to half of their portfolio, this would represent a decrease
in the share of U.S. assets in foreign (private and central bank) portfolios,
(1¡®¤), from 30% to 28%. The computations we presented earlier suggest
that this is a substantial shift.
304.5 The Euro, the Yen, and the Renminbi
We have focused so far on the dollar depreciation. However a central issue
is how much of this depreciation is likely to be distributed against the euro,
the yen, the renminbi, and other currencies.
To do so formally requires extending our model to (at least) three countries.
We have started to do this, but we are not yet there. Here are some remarks
and speculations.
² Along the adjustment path, what matters is the reallocation of
wealth across countries, and thus the bilateral current account bal-
ances of the United States vis a vis its partners. Because of home
bias, wealth transfers modify the relative world demands for assets,
thus requiring corresponding exchange rate movements.
Since the current U.S. de¯cit is mostly with Asia, this suggests that
what will matter most are the asset preferences of Asian investors|
both private and o±cial, governments and central banks|relative
to U.S. investors. Home bias implies that the transfer of wealth to
China and Japan will lead to an appreciation of Asian currencies vis
a vis the dollar. What happens to the euro depends on the relative
preferences of U.S. and Asian investors vis a vis the euro. If we as-
sume that they are roughly similar, then the demand for euro assets
will remain roughly the same. This suggests that, along the adjust-
ment path, the dollar will depreciate most against Asian currencies,
less so against the euro.
This smooth adjustment path is likely to be disturbed by the shocks
we considered in the various scenarios earlier. What happens to the
euro, the yen and the renminbi depends on the scenario.
² If, for example, the main alternative to the U.S. bonds market is
the euro bond market, then in response to a shift away from U.S.
31bonds, the dollar will depreciate more vis a vis the euro than vis a
vis the yen.
² If the PBC stops pegging the renminbi to the dollar, then the ob-
vious implication is that the renmimbi will appreciate. The more
interesting question is what will happen to the dollar vis a vis the
euro.
It is often asserted that the recent appreciation of the euro vis a
vis the dollar is (at least in part) the side-e®ect of the Chinese peg,
which has shifted all the pressure onto the euro-dollar rate. Let the
renminbi °oat and the pressure on the euro will fade away. We think
this argument is simply wrong.
Suppose that the PBC stops pegging, but leaves capital controls in
place. If private Chinese investors cannot replace the PBC, the Chi-
nese current account will have to be balanced. If this is the case, the
world distribution of assets will shift away towards investors who
have less of a preference for dollars, and more of a preference for eu-
ros and yens than the PBC (the PBC behaves like a private investor
with an extreme preference for dollars. Most private investors have
less extreme preferences). The euro and the yen will therefore ap-
preciate vis a vis the dollar|although what happens to either the
multilateral yen or euro exchange rate is a priori ambiguous; this
depends on the composition of trade of Europe, and of Japan.
Suppose that, as the PBC stops pegging, capital controls are also re-
moved, so private Chinese investors can replace, at least in part, the
PBC. The implications are the same as before: Private Chinese in-
vestors are likely to want to hold at least some of their foreign assets
in euro and yen assets. Thus, the euro and the yen will appreciate
vis a vis the dollar.
Suppose that the PBC continues to peg the renminbi, but decides
32to change the composition of its reserves away from dollars. Then,
the same argument applies (and also applies to a similar change, if
implemented by the BOJ). The relative demand for euro and yen
assets will increase, leading to an appreciation of both the euro and
the yen vis a vis the dollar.
5 Conclusions
We have o®ered a simple model to organize thoughts about the U.S. current
account de¯cit and the dollar.
From a methodological viewpoint, the model allows for imperfect substitu-
tion and valuation e®ects. The relevance of valuation e®ects has recently
been emphasized in a number of papers: The explicit integration of valua-
tion e®ects in a model of imperfect substitutability is, we believe, novel.
From an empirical viewpoint, we have looked at numbers, shifts, and im-
plications. The bottom line is that more dollar depreciation is to come.
A further shift in investors' preferences towards dollar assets would provide
only temporary relief for the dollar. It would lead to an initial appreciation,
but the accompanying loss of competitiveness would speed up the accumu-
lation of foreign debt. The long run value of the dollar would be even lower.
Thus the argument that the United States, thanks to the attractiveness of
its assets, can keep running large current account de¯cits with no e®ect
on the dollar, appears to overlook the long run consequences of a large
accumulation of external liabilities.
For basically the same reason, an increase in interest rates would be self
defeating. It would temporarily strengthen the dollar, but eventually the
depreciation needed to restore equilibrium in the current account would be
even larger{both because (as in the case of a shift in portfolio preferences)
33the accumulation of foreign liabilities would accelerate, and because even-
tually the U.S. would need to ¯nance a larger °ow of interest payments
abroad{because both interest rates and debt would be higher. A much bet-
ter mix would be a decrease in interest rates, and a reduction in budget
de¯cits to avoid overheating. (To state the obvious: Tighter ¯scal policy is
needed to reduce the current account de¯cit, but is not a substitute for the
dollar depreciation. Both are needed.)
A number of bad news could hit the dollar. The most likely is a decision by
Asian central banks to stop buying dollars, or to rebalance their portfolios
reducing the share of reserves held in the form of dollar assets. Our numbers
suggest that such a rebalancing would represent a signi¯cant shift in world
demand for dollar assets.
The end of the Chinese peg would be bad news for the dollar. Contrary to
a view commonly held in Europe, it might be bad news for Europe as well:
The Euro is likely to further appreciate vis a vis the dollar. The reason is
that an investor with extreme preferences for dollar assets{the PBC{would
exit the market.
We end with one more general remark. A large fall in the dollar is not
by itself a catastrophy for the United States. By itself, it leads to higher
demand and higher output, and it o®ers the opportunity to reduce budget
de¯cits without triggering a recession. The danger is much more serious
for Japan and Western Europe. While the appropriate response to a euro
or yen appreciation, given their current position, should be looser money
and possibly looser ¯scal policy as well, their room for macroeconomic ma-
neuver is very limited. Interest rates are already low, and de¯cits relatively
high. The dollar depreciation is certain to create more problems in Europe
and Japan than in the United States.
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